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Where are the Concepts?   
What Words Can and Can’t Reveal 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
To study concepts, cognitive scientists need to be able to identify them. The prevailing 
assumption has been that general-purpose, non-linguistic concepts are revealed by words such as 
triangle, table, and robin. But languages vary dramatically in how they carve up the world by 
name
1
. Either these concepts are heavily language-dependent or the words of a language cannot 
be a direct route to them. In this chapter we argue that the second of these possibilities is true.  
We illustrate our point with a study of words for human locomotion. This study shows that 
shared conceptual content across four languages is distinct from the answers suggested by any 
single language. It supports the conclusion that words such as triangle, table, and robin do not 
individuate general-purpose concepts. However, they can identify underlying components of 
domain knowledge, which suggests new approaches to understanding conceptual representation.   
 
1.2 The Word-Concept Problem 
Smith and Medin (1981) opened Categories and Concepts by declaring that concepts give 
human experience stability and that mental life would be chaotic without concepts. Thirty years 
later, similar sentiments continue to be expressed. Murphy (2002) argues that concepts hold our 
mental world together, and Bloom (2004) suggests that a creature without concepts would be 
unable to learn. Concepts are considered so fundamental to human cognition that Fodor (1998) 
asserted that “the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts” (p. vii). If concepts are so 
important for cognitive scientists to understand, then cognitive scientists need to be able to 
identify relevant concepts to study. In this paper, we ask what role words can play in identifying 
them.  
To address this question, we need a working definition of concepts. Murphy (2002) 
suggests that concepts are mental representations of classes of objects in the world and that they 
tell their holders what things there are and what properties they have. Carey (2009) indicates that 
concepts are units of thoughts that are the constituents of beliefs and theories. Bloom (2000) 
suggests that they are mental representations of kinds, and Solomon, Medin, and Lynch (1999) 
offer that concepts are building blocks of thought and that they have, among their functions, 
supporting classification, inference, and conceptual combination. Taken together, such remarks 
suggest that concepts are stable units of knowledge in long-term memory that represent 
meaningful sets of entities in the world and provide the elements out of which more complex 
thoughts are constructed. Although many authors using the term do not provide an explicit 
definition, this description seems to capture the general usage (though a few propose alternatives; 
see Barsalou, 1987; Smith & Samuelson, 1997; Prinz, 2002). Throughout most of this paper, this 
dominant approach is what we will address. In Section 3, we will revisit this use of the term and 
consider whether alternative ways of describing mental representations of the world may be 
more useful.  
Among those using the general notion of concepts just described, the prevailing 
assumption seems to be that many important concepts can be easily identified because they are 
revealed by words – in fact, for many researchers, the words of English. Smith and Medin (1981) 
used English nouns such as hat, fish, triangle, table, and robin to identify concepts, as did Rosch 
(e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) and Lakoff 
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(1987). More recent investigations have continued in the same vein (e.g., Murphy, 2002; Fodor, 
1998, who takes English nouns to reveal the stock of basic concepts that might be innate; and 
Carey, 2009, who says that the concepts that interest her are roughly the grain of single lexical 
items, and that representations of word meanings are paradigm examples of concepts. Even in 
formal and computational models, discussions of the formalisms are illustrated with examples 
using English nouns (e.g., Kruschke, 2005; Rogers & McClelland, 2004). And this approach has 
not been limited to those studying “concepts” per se. Harnad (2005) declares “kinds” to be the 
world’s potential affordances to sensorimotor systems, but he goes on to suggest finding out 
what those kinds are by opening a dictionary.Work on conceptual combination has taken nouns 
such as chocolate and bee or zebra and fish to indicate what concepts are combined (e.g., 
Hampton, 1997, 2012; Wisniewski, 1996). In work on neural representation of concepts and on 
deficits due to brain injury or disease, “conceptual judgment” tasks often entail responding to 
nouns; e.g., Kable, Kan, Wilson, Thompson-Schill, & Chatterjee, 2005; Mahon & Caramazza, 
2007). In cognitive development research, appeals to English nouns such as horse, cow, boot, 
and sail are prevalent in identifying children’s concepts (e.g., Bloom, 2000; Gelman, 2006; Hills, 
Maouene, Maouene, Sheya, & Smith, 2009; Keil, 1989, Xu, 2005). Kelemen and Carey (2007) 
talk about the meaning of the word accordion and the concept of accordion interchangeably, and 
Gentner (2005) identifies relational concepts by reference to English nouns (gift, weapon, 
predator, etc.). Even discussions of visual object recognition (e.g., Ullman, 1998; Ullman, Vidal-
Naquit, & Sali, 2002) and of concept representations in non-linguistic primates and pre-linguistic 
infants (e.g., Phillips & Santos, 2007) often identify the concepts or kinds that are to be 
recognized or acquired by means of English nouns.  
At an intuitive level, this approach seems reasonable. After all, it makes sense to think 
that a person who has a grasp of the words cat and chair has concepts of cats and chairs. If 
entities in the world fall into natural groupings according to their shared properties – as has been 
argued by a number of researchers (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Berlin, 1992; Hunn, 1977; Rosch et al., 
1976; Rogers & McClelland, 2004) – then it also makes sense to take English words to capture 
those groupings and to be associated with a coherent mental representation of those groupings. 
For instance, the noun chair will capture a set of objects sharing properties such as having a seat, 
a back, legs, and supporting a human in a particular position, and people will have a concept 
involving knowledge about this set of things. And, if the preceding points are right, there is no 
need for concern about the fact that it happens to be English words that are often invoked, 
because other languages should have words that capture essentially the same groupings and are 
associated with essentially the same concepts. 
 But from a different perspective, this approach is startling. Word meanings are highly 
selective in what elements of experience they encode. Because of this selectivity, there are many 
possible ways to map between words and the world (Wolff & Malt, 2010). Cross-linguistic 
research indicates that languages vary dramatically in how they carve up the world by name. 
Substantial cross-linguistic variation has been documented in domains including color, causality, 
mental states, number, body parts, containers, motion, direction, spatial relations, and terms for 
acts of cutting and breaking and of carrying and holding (see chapters in Malt & Wolff, 2010, for 
detailed illustrations; also Evans & Levinson, 2009; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Gumperz 
& Levinson, 1996; Kay, Berlin, Maffi, & Merrifield, 1997; Majid, Boster, & Bowerman, 2008; 
Majid, Enfield, & van Staden, 2006; Majid & Levinson, 2011; Saji, Imai, Saalbach, Zhang, Shu, 
& Okada, 2011, Wierzbicka, 2009, among others). As the list indicates, this variation occurs 
even in concrete domains labeled by nouns, where structure in the world might seem most likely 
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to provide salient groupings that would be captured by the words of any language. For instance, 
papers in Majid et al. (2006) document diversity in how languages divide up the human body 
with body part terms, and Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, & Wang (1999) found diversity in how 
languages divide up ordinary household containers (see also Malt, Sloman, & Gennari, 2003). 
Hand versus arm, bottle versus jar, or dish versus plate may seem to English-speakers to be self-
evident distinctions based on obvious discontinuities in the distribution of properties in the 
world, but not all languages observe these same distinctions. Even when structure in the world 
does produce shared tendencies in meanings (e.g., the joints for body part terms, Majid, 2010), it 
under-determines how any given language will map words onto elements of the world. And this 
diversity is not only a matter of making fewer versus more distinctions. Languages often 
partially or substantially cross-cut each other in the sets of entities that they group together (e.g., 
Bowerman, 1996a, b; Malt et al., 2003). For example, whereas English speakers distinguish 
spatial relations of containment from support (in versus on) and ignore variations in tightness of 
fit or attachment to the surface, Korean speakers label relations of tight containment and 
attachment with one word (kkita), contrasting with loose containment (nehta), and loose support 
(nohta) (Bowerman, 1996a, b).  
If the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, then the field risks serious, 
even fatal, defects, by overlooking the implications of this diversity. As the just cited work 
establishes, differences among languages are not merely cute examples for cocktail party 
conversation (cf. de Boinod, 2006, on “extraordinary words from around the world”). Diversity 
in how languages carve up the world by name is more of a rule than an exception across many 
domains. In light of the documented diversity, there are three logical possibilities for the nature 
of the relationship between words and underlying, general purpose concepts that serve as the 
elements out of which more complex thoughts are constructed. These possibilities have clear 
consequences for theories of mental representations, and for how researchers would need to look 
for concepts. 
The first possibility is that the words of a language do effectively reveal much of the 
stock of basic concepts that a person holds. Importantly, given the pervasive cross-linguistic 
variability in naming patterns, this possibility implies that word-learning creates much of the 
language user’s non-linguistic representations of the world (cf. Whorf, 1956). Under this 
scenario, it is not possible to hold that any substantial stock of basic concepts is shared across 
speakers of different languages. Concepts revealed by English words will be true of English 
speakers, those revealed by Spanish words will be true of Spanish speakers, and so on, and these 
language-specific sets will be substantially different from one another. Models of semantic 
cognition (e.g., Rogers & McClelland, 2004) would need to be taken as models of a particular 
language group and modified to give a larger role to names in establishing similarity among 
representations of entities. Under this perspective, views of conceptual development would need 
to grant that the end result of development is a highly language-specific set of concepts (not just 
word meanings), regardless of any inborn, universal systems of “core cognition” (Carey, 2009) 
or universal pre-linguistic sensitivities to certain conceptual distinctions (e.g., Casasola & Cohen, 
2002; Gentner & Bowerman, 2009; Göksun, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2010).  
The second possibility is that the stock of basic, general-purpose concepts is dissociated 
to some notable extent from the large differences in naming patterns, and it is therefore 
impossible to use words to identify these concepts. After all, much learning about the world 
comes from direct interaction, rather than through language. Furthermore, attention to and 
memory for information in the world may be shaped in part by cognitive constraints (such as 
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limits on processing capacity) and evolutionary influences (such as special sensitivity to 
survival-relevant information) that are independent of the language spoken (e.g., Bock, Carreiras, 
& Meseguer, 2012; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Seligman, 1971; Willems, de Boer, de Ruiter, 
Noordzij, Hagoort, & Toni, 2010). Although speakers of all languages do not make the same 
bottle versus jar naming distinction that English speakers do (Malt et al., 1999), they are likely to 
note the same differences among different-sized and -shaped containers regarding their 
suitability for storing and extracting various types of substances. The dissociation possibility 
suggests that non-linguistic representations can be substantially shared despite linguistic 
variability, while still allowing that language could have some influence on mental 
representations. Under this possibility, there may be many widely shared general purpose 
representations. There also may be some non-linguistic representations that are shaped by the 
language spoken, but the shaping will not necessarily fully align the conceptual content with 
individual words. Crucially, if linguistic and non-linguistic representations are distinct and only 
loosely linked, then words are no longer direct vehicles to general-purpose concepts. The words 
of a language cannot routinely and straightforwardly be used to identify a person’s concepts.  
 Empirical evidence supports a dissociation in at least some domains.  Malt et al. found 
strong correspondence in similarity judgments for common household containers among 
speakers of these three languages despite distinctly different naming patterns, and Ameel, 
Storms, Malt, & Sloman (2005) found similar results for Belgian speakers of French versus 
Dutch (see also Kronenfeld, Armstrong, & Wilmoth, 1985). Also using artifacts, Saalbach and 
Imai (2007, 2012) found no influence of noun classifier categories on Mandarin speakers’ object 
judgments in several tasks (although they did find a small influence in two other tasks; see also 
Huettig, Chen, Bowerman, & Majid, 2010). Similar findings also exist for other domains. 
Comparing 17 languages for color naming versus color sorting, Roberson, Davies, Corbett, and 
Vandervyver (2005) found considerable similarity in grouping behavior despite substantial 
variation in naming. Munnich, Landau, and Dosher (2001) found that Korean and English 
speakers’ memory for spatial locations varied less than their naming of the locations (see also 
Coventry, Valdés, & Guijarro-Fuentes, 2010), and several studies have found dissociations 
between labeling of actions and attention to or memory for elements of the actions (e.g., Gennari, 
Sloman, Malt, & Fitch, 2002; Papafragou, Hulbert, & Trueswell, 2008; see also Sauter, LeGuen, 
& Haun, 2011, on similar dissociations for emotional expression). If the evidence and arguments 
just cited are valid, this could mean that the second possibility above is right, the first is wrong, 
and words must be thrown out as a way of accessing concepts.  
 However, a third possibility, less obvious than the first two, also exists and needs to be 
evaluated. This third possibility is that the relation of words to the stock of general-purpose 
concepts is not as straightforward as current practice has taken it to be (as also suggested in the 
second possibility), but still, if examined in the right way, words may reveal something useful 
about conceptual representations shared across speakers of different languages. By looking 
beyond individual words from a language as if they provide a direct route to concepts, and 
applying more sophisticated techniques to extract structure from individual language naming or 
naming aggregated across languages, it may be possible to discern shared elements of meaning 
that indicate constraints on cross-language variability and reflect some common underlying 
aspects of how knowledge of the domain is represented. In this case, words may retain utility in 
identifying a shared understanding of a domain. However, what they reveal may not necessarily 
match the traditional idea of units of knowledge representing meaningful sets of entities in the 
world. We consider alternative ways of thinking about conceptual representation in Section 3. 
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  In short, linguistic diversity in naming patterns has been well-documented across many 
domains but it is rarely considered in the study of concepts. It has potentially profound 
implications for this study, but exactly what the implications are remain to be pinned down. 
Next, we discuss some data that evaluate different ways of tapping into the information provided 
by words about conceptualization of a domain and help discriminate among the three 
possibilities. These data illustrate what words reveal under different approaches and what an 
appropriate use of words is for researchers whose interest is in underlying non-linguistic 
representations rather than in knowledge about the word meanings of a particular language. In 
doing so, the data specify some key implications of linguistic diversity for the study of concepts.  
 
1.3 Additional Considerations 
Before turning to this illustration, we note two points about past treatment of the relation of 
words to concepts in the literature.  
First, some, or perhaps many, researchers who use words of English (or another 
language) to point to concepts may only be using the words as convenient shorthand. They do 
not necessarily have an explicit commitment to a strong Whorfian position regarding the 
alignment of words and the stock of basic, general-purpose concepts. However, being non-
committal on the issue is problematic once the pervasive cross-linguistic diversity in naming 
patterns is recognized. Either words must largely determine these concepts, or they cannot serve 
as useful shorthands for them. If the second is true, a separate account is needed of what 
constitutes these concepts and how they can be identified. Some researchers may also hold a 
somewhat more nuanced view of the word-concept relation. For instance, Murphy (2002), 
despite using English words to identify concepts throughout most of his book, argues in a chapter 
on word meaning that word meanings do not always have a simple one-to-one relation to 
concepts and that meanings may be composed of a part of a concept or built out of multiple ones. 
If taken as his real position, this leaves Murphy the problem of how to identify what the more 
basic, general-purpose concepts actually are – an odd dilemma in a book that is primarily about 
concepts. Rogers and McClelland (2004) provide their own answer to what the concepts are. 
Echoing Rosch and Mervis (1975) and others, they take the correlational structure of the world to 
provide the ultimate answer, with mental representations of objects clustering based on similarity 
of properties. However, their inferences about what the similarity relations are come only from 
considering English nouns. They assume that the correlational structure of the world produces 
concepts corresponding to chair, table, etc. They do not provide any independent means of 
verifying either structure in the world or conceptual structure – again, problematic without a 
commitment to the alignment of words and concepts (cf. Majid & Huettig, 2008).  
Second, there is one sense of the term concept in which it must be true that the words of a 
language effectively reveal the concepts held by its speakers. That is when concept is used to 
mean the knowledge associated with words. In this sense, if English bottle is applied to a 
somewhat different set of objects and carries somewhat different featural implications than 
Spanish botella (Malt et al., 1999, 2003), then English and Spanish speakers have acquired 
somewhat different concepts. To the extent that the goal of concept researchers is to study 
exactly those chunks of knowledge encoded by the words of a particular language (lexicalized 
concepts), there is nothing wrong with using words to identify the knowledge to be studied.  
But there are several reasons why studying the knowledge associated with words is not 
sufficient for understanding conceptual representation more broadly. First, if lexicalized concepts 
are taken as constituting the main set of general-purpose concepts that cognitive scientists should 
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know about, then this approach functionally makes elements of language – word meanings – the 
primary medium of thought, whereas cognitive scientists generally accept that there is a medium 
in which thought takes place that is distinct from any language used for external communication 
(Fodor, 1975). Second, by taking word meanings to reveal the stock of basic concepts used in 
more complex thought, it commits cognitive science a priori to a strong version of the Whorfian 
hypothesis in which it is language that creates that stock of concepts. Finally, cognitive scientists 
who use words to identify concepts most often seem to actually have a different goal than the 
goal of understanding the knowledge associated with words of a specific language. Rosch (Rosch 
& Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976) explicitly contrasted the view that segmentation of the world 
is arbitrary with her own hypothesis that the world contains inherent structure ready to be 
recognized by human perceivers. Keil (1989) appealed to “causal homeostasis”, suggesting that 
concepts (in at least some domains) are formed in recognition of networks of properties in the 
world that are causally connected to one another. More recently, as just noted, Rogers and 
McClelland (2004) appeal to structure in the world as the determinant of conceptual content. 
Bloom (2004) argues at some length that language is a tool for thought but is not the mechanism 
that gives rise to the capacity to generate and appreciate ideas in the first place. If word meanings 
may be composed of a part of a concept or built out of multiple ones (Murphy, 2002; see also 
Clark, 1983), likewise, some more basic stock of conceptual elements must be the building 
blocks of word meaning. Furthermore, any researcher interested in the possibility of innate 
concepts, along with those who aim to study concepts in non-linguistic primates or in pre-
linguistic infants, must be seeking ones that are not created by learning of words of a language. 
Much of the time, then, concepts researchers seem to have a goal of studying representations that 
are not created by language, even while using the words of one particular language to find them. 
In sum, our goal is not to argue against the idea that words may gain meaning by 
association with conceptual content. Nor are we arguing that the content associated with a word 
cannot be called a lexicalized concept. Our concern is with what role words can play in 
identifying concepts in the sense of general-purpose representations that are not inherently part 
of linguistic knowledge.  
 
2. A Case Study: Words for Human Locomotion 
We now turn to some data on naming patterns for English, Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese for 
forms of human locomotion (walking, running, skipping, hopping, and so on). Humans around 
the world are capable of the same forms of locomotion regardless of location or culture, 
suggesting that there may be substantial shared elements of their understanding of this domain.  
At the same time, based on previous data for a more limited sample of locomotion stimuli 
(produced on a treadmill that varied in speed and slope; Malt, Gennari, Imai, Ameel, Tsuda, & 
Majid, 2008) we had reason to expect some diversity in naming patterns. This domain therefore 
provides a useful case study of the relation of naming patterns to conceptualization. The stimuli 
were 36 video clips, 3-4 seconds in length, depicting upright, bipedal human locomotion of as 
wide a variety as we could generate. All actions were demonstrated by an American college 
student. Fig. 1 shows sample frames from four clips.  
[insert Fig. 1 about here] 
To determine the names each language has for the range of human locomotion depicted, we 
asked native speakers of the four languages, mostly undergraduates or graduate students resident 
in their home countries, to look at each clip and name it. Participants viewed the clips embedded 
in a web page and for each one, answered the question “What is the woman doing? She is….” or 
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its translation in the appropriate language. More details of the methods, as well as analyses not 
discussed here, can be found in Malt et al. (2013). Here, we consider the sets of names produced 
in each language, how names are distributed across actions within each language, and whether 
there are shared patterns in this distribution across languages. For each analysis, we consider the 
implications for understanding how words may relate to concepts.  
 
2.1 Name inventories  
We first determined the set of names that were used in each language for these actions. This 
analysis is most like the usual approach of concept researchers, except that the standard approach 
stops with a single language and does not compare the results with what other languages would 
suggest. We asked whether the different languages show consensus on what these concepts 
would be.  
 There was diversity in the surface form people used in their responses. For instance, for a 
given clip, in English, many participants might have said that the woman is walking but a few 
might have said doing a walk and some even said just walks or a walk. Some may also have said 
that the woman is walking slowly, or walking fast with her arms swinging. We counted as an 
instance of the same name all surface forms containing the same root word(s) labeling a manner 
of movement, and we tallied these names for each clip to determine the frequency of names 
produced across the participants. We considered each clip’s “dominant” name to be whatever 
word was produced most often across the participants in the language group. Clips for which 
fewer than 30% of respondents agreed on a name were considered “mixed”.  
 It is worth considering first what concepts would be identified by simple, single 
morpheme words. These words are most like the ones generally considered to pick out basic-
level concepts in the psychological literature (e.g., Murphy, 1988; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).  The 
mono-morphemic words that emerged as dominant for at least one film clip in a language are 
given in Table 1
2
. This tally makes clear that if there are universally shared concepts of this 
domain, these words do not directly reveal what they are. The different languages provide 
different answers about what that set would be.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 There are also arguments for seeing if conventional names that have more than one 
morpheme can help reveal the most basic concepts. Brown (1958) observed that when people 
name at the “level of usual utility”, that name is occasionally longer than a less-used name. For 
instance, a certain fruit is more likely to be called strawberry than fruit. A small number of 
Rosch et al.’s (1976) “basic level” terms were of this nature (e.g., screwdriver, airplane). 
Furthermore, across languages, the same notion may be expressed in different forms: A male 
child in English is mono-morphemic boy, but in Yucatec, it is xi’pal, containing morphemes for 
male and for child, and in Spanish, it is muchacho (or niño), a single root with a masculine suffix 
(Lucy, 2010). Along those lines, for speakers of Japanese, limiting consideration to simple, 
mono-morphemic responses risks excluding some common action labels. Japanese speakers use 
a construction consisting of an action noun plus the light verb suru (‘do’) to refer to some 
actions. Such phrases are similar to English doing a jump or doing a march step, except that 
some are fixed, conventional, and common labels for actions. Boldfaced names in Table 1 are 
those added under this version of the tally. Under this count, the Japanese number of unique 
names is similar to that for Spanish, but both remain below the level of English and Dutch. The 
basic observations from before remain intact. The languages differ markedly in the inventory of 
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names they display for this domain, and so names do not identify a universal set of shared 
concepts.  
 Could the speakers really vary so much in their concepts of this domain? And could they 
really lack concepts of some of the actions, as suggested by the clips designated mixed, for which 
there is no agreed-upon name? For instance, do Japanese speakers lack a concept of running in 
place that the other speakers have? The remaining analyses help address this question, but for 
now we note that it seems unlikely that American and Belgian traditions or current lifestyles lead 
individuals to develop more highly differentiated locomotion concepts, overall, than Argentinean 
and Japanese experiences do. If there are differences in the conceptual inventory as large as is 
suggested by the naming difference, it seems they must be directly created by the language 
differences, in line with the strongest form of a Whorfian perspective.  
 However, a glance at the entire phrases participants produced show that speakers of all 
the languages are, in various ways, making many more distinctions among the actions than those 
reflected in the conventional names. For instance, Spanish speakers often used modifiers to 
discriminate among cases of saltar done on one foot versus two (hop versus jump for English 
speakers), and speakers of all the languages used location modifiers to point out the actions done 
in place. This observation suggests that people may have concepts important to the domain that 
are not captured in a single word. In the anthropological literature, it has been noted that many 
languages lack labels equivalent to English plant and animal, as well as for some groupings 
within these kingdoms, but the groupings still seem to be recognized as indicated by various non-
verbal behaviors (e.g., Berlin, 1992). If a similar situation holds here, then, again, we have to 
conclude that words are a poor indicator of where the concepts of interest lie (even if modest 
cultural differences do exist among the groups).  
   This first analysis points out the fundamental problem of taking individual words of any 
one language to directly reveal concepts: Different languages will give different answers to what 
the concepts are, and these linguistic differences are likely to exceed the extent of any conceptual 
differences. We now ask whether other ways of examining the naming data do a better job at 
uncovering shared concepts. To the extent that they do, the results will underscore the fallacy of 
treating the individual words as if they directly reveal concepts. At the same time, they will 
suggest that naming data, examined in an appropriate way, may still provide some evidence of a 
shared understanding of the domain.  
 
2.2 Treating Individual Languages’ Naming as Similarity Data 
In this analysis, we asked whether commonalities emerge from the naming data of the four 
languages if we make use of the full set of names produced by all participants for all stimuli. 
Many clips did not produce 100% name consensus within a language group, so even if one 
language has different dominant names for two clips (e.g., walk and stroll), and another gives 
them the same name (e.g., caminar), some speakers of the first language may have produced the 
same name for both (e.g., walk), pointing to a perceived similarity between them. We created 
name similarity matrices that reflect the extent to which each pair of objects received the same 
name across the speakers of a language. To do this, we assigned, for each participant, a 0 or a 1 
to each possible pair of clips according to whether the person gave the two clips a different name 
or the same name (again, tallied according to the guidelines described above). There are 630 
such pairs, given the 36 clips. We then constructed a similarity matrix for each language group 
by summing the distance values for each of the 630 pairs of clips across the participants in that 
language group. This use of the data is similar to using confusion matrices as similarity data 
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(e.g., Rothkopf, 1957; Shepard & Chang, 1963). By taking into account the full naming array for 
each clip and applying scaling techniques to the similarity matrices, commonalities among 
languages may become more evident.  
  We correlated the name similarity matrices for each pair of languages to give an overall 
sense of the correspondence in the naming patterns, using the Mantel test for correlation of 
matrices (Mantel, 1967). These correlations are all significant, falling between .65 and .82. The 
correlations indicate that the full patterns of name use, while diverse, still share some substantial 
commonalities.  
We then carried out multi-dimensional scaling on the matrix for each language 
(procedure MDS, SAS Institute, 1999). To help interpret the results, Additive tree clusters were 
drawn on the solutions (Corter, 1982; Sattath & Tversky, 1977). Solutions for the four languages 
are shown in Figs. 2 – 5, with only the top two levels of clusters for ease of viewing. Labels in 
the solution refer to the clip names bestowed by the experimenters (not the name given by 
participants) so that the solutions can be compared with regard to which clips are grouped 
together across the languages. 
[insert Figs. 2-5 about here] 
  These solutions, while showing similarities, also highlight important differences. For all 
four languages, the horizontal dimension is interpretable in terms of the basic biomechanical 
distinction between an elastic impact-and-recoil motion (characteristic of running gaits and 
others such as hopping and jumping) and a pendulum motion (characteristic of walking gaits), 
where one foot is on the ground at all times (e.g., Alexander, 2002; Bennett, 1992). (The 
pendulum-based gaits appear toward the left-hand side of each solution and the impact-and-
recoil toward the right.) However, the exact spatial layout of clips varies considerably across the 
languages. The vertical dimension for the most part seems to reflect a dimension of speed and/or 
aggressiveness (with slower/less aggressive actions lower and faster/more aggressive ones higher 
for English and Spanish and vice versa for Dutch), but the Japanese solution less clearly 
conforms to this possibility. The clusters resulting from the Addtree analysis reinforce the idea 
that the biomechanical distinction is salient for two of the languages – Dutch and Japanese – 
which have top-level clusters separating essentially the same sets of clips (though Dutch places 
the RUN_FAST clip just into the cluster of pendulum motions). English and Spanish clusters are 
less like the Dutch and Japanese results: for English, running actions cluster with pendulum 
motions at the top level, and for Spanish, walking backwards and several forms of marching 
combine with impact-and-recoil motions, as well as walking in place. In the next level of clusters 
within these top-level clusters, each language more or less separates the faster/more aggressive 
pendulum actions from slower, more cautious pendulum actions, but the exact composition of 
the clusters is variable. The Dutch solution, in particular, does not honor this separation as much 
as the others.  
 These solutions indicate that the naming patterns of the four languages reflect a shared 
orientation to the same dimensions of the movements. This outcome supports the idea that 
speakers of the four languages may have more in common in their perception of the domain than 
their name inventories indicate. In light of the variability of the Addtree clusters across the four 
solutions, though, it remains difficult to say exactly what could be identified as shared discrete 
concepts in the traditional sense.  
 
2.3 Treating Aggregated Naming as Similarity Data 
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 Last, we created a multi-dimensional scaling solution combining the naming data of participants 
in all four language groups. MDS by its nature looks for commonalities in the data, and to the 
extent that it finds them, produces a coherent solution. If a coherent solution emerges, this result 
would again support the idea of a shared conceptualization of the domain while underscoring the 
inadequacy of individual words of a single language to reveal it. Compatible with this possibility, 
Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal (2007) examined the highly variable color terms across 110 
languages and found evidence for a general well-formedness constraint of maximizing similarity 
within lexical categories and minimizing it across categories. Khetarpal, Majid, and Regier 
(2009) obtained similar results for spatial terms of nine languages. More similar to the current 
analysis, Majid et al. (2008) aggregated across 28 languages’ verbs for cutting and breaking and 
found a shared set of dimensions underlying the different naming patterns. With only four 
languages to combine here, our data provide less to aggregate, but the smaller sample of 
languages is more like that typically available to psychologists working on concepts. From that 
perspective, it is particularly useful to see if a coherent conceptual space emerges from the data 
of only four languages.  
 We carried out multi-dimensional scaling as before. Fig. 6 shows the two-dimensional 
solution, with clusters again provided by Addtree. This solution shows a neat horizontal 
separation of the impact-and-recoil motions (toward the right) from the pendulum motions 
(toward the left). The vertical dimension again appears to reflect something like speed and 
aggressiveness of the actions, with slower/less aggressive actions toward the top and faster/more 
aggressive ones toward the bottom.  
[insert Fig. 6 about here] 
 At the top level of clustering, the impact-and-recoil motions are separated from the 
pendulum-based ones, with the exception of the TROT clip falling into the pendulum cluster. 
The placement of the TROT clip is most likely because of the qualities of the particular action 
implemented in the clip, which was a bouncy motion but with little or no evidence of both feet 
being off the ground at the same time. Within these clusters, sub-clusters separate the running 
clips from the other impact-and-recoil actions, and separate the true pendulum motion clips from 
the intermediate TROT clip. These clusters are thus readily interpretable, although they do not 
seem to map directly onto the words of any of the languages.  
 So, the naming data when aggregated across the four languages provides more indication 
of a systematic conceptual space than looking at scaling solutions of the four languages 
individually does. This shared space emerges out of the noisiness of the individual name 
inventories, which make different distinctions and numbers of distinctions. Because MDS can 
discover commonalities in data but it cannot invent them, the simplicity of the solution is 
evidence in favor of a shared underlying understanding of the domain. At the same time, though, 
if the clusters identified by Addtree are taken to indicate discrete concepts within this space, they 
do not seem to be picked out by words of the languages. This outcome again suggests a shared 
conceptualization of the domain that is not revealed by the words of any single language. 
 
 2.4 Conclusions from Using Names to Reveal Conceptual Space 
These analyses demonstrate that languages differ in what their name inventories would tell us the 
concepts for the domain are. If there are shared general-purpose concepts, then the words of any 
one language do not directly reveal what they are. Moreover, different ways of counting names 
(mono-morphemic only versus including multi-morphemic ones) produce somewhat different 
answers. Even if we were to adopt a strong version of the Whorfian hypothesis and assume that 
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words of a language do directly reveal basic concepts for speakers of that language, it is not clear 
which way of counting would be the right one to use, and using names as direct pointers to 
concepts would remain problematic.  
  Despite the diversity in the name inventories, other ways of analyzing the data show 
commonalities underlying the naming patterns. In particular, scaling of the combined naming 
data of four languages produces a coherent and interpretable solution, suggesting a shared 
orientation to certain dimensions of the space. Still, the clusters within the scaling solution do not 
neatly correspond to those labeled by the names of the languages, raising questions about what, 
if anything, can be identified as discrete concepts in the traditional sense.  
 
3. Issues and Implications 
 
3.1 Implications for the Status Quo  
The data make a strong case that the relation of words to concepts is not straightforward. 
Pervasive linguistic diversity, amply documented in other research but rarely taken into 
consideration within “concepts” research, is by itself cause for serious concern. It would still be 
possible to preserve a commitment to word-concept alignment by subscribing to a strong version 
of the Whorfian idea that language shapes thought. However, the evidence here from aggregated 
naming suggests that any conceptual differences are less than implied by the differences in word 
inventories. This evidence is also consistent with past findings in other domains and the 
observation that attention to and understanding of aspects of the world are likely shaped by 
multiple forces that may include but are not limited to language (see Section 1.2). It seems 
unavoidable to conclude that researchers need to stop relying on the word inventories of English, 
or any other single language, to know what constitutes the concepts of a domain.  
  In light of our data and arguments, what should be made of the existing literature on 
concepts? We suggest that what is being studied in many cases – those where probing of 
knowledge comes in the form of asking for responses of various sorts to the words of English or 
another language – is people’s knowledge associated with the words. There is nothing wrong 
with investigating knowledge associated with words, and making this clarification does not cast 
doubt on the value of the work. It does, however, suggest the need to reframe the understanding 
of what the work reveals, because this methodology does not directly shed light on general-
purpose non-linguistic concepts, possibly shared across speakers of different languages. The only 
alternative is for the researcher to cast the work as directly investigating non-linguistic concepts 
by making an explicit commitment to a strong version of a Whorfian perspective and defending 
this perspective. Whichever approach the researcher takes, it should always take into account the 
existing pervasive cross-linguistic diversity and the fact that word inventories can only be used 
as the means of tapping units of knowledge by committing to the notion that the units accessed 
are language-specific.  
 It might be possible to argue for a direct alignment of words with general-purpose 
concepts for some domains on the grounds that in certain domains, word meanings should be 
broadly shared across speakers of different languages. Such word meanings could be 
hypothesized to exist for any innate concepts, and for concepts that are developed in a similar 
way across cultures due to cross-cultural recognition of structure in the world. A logistical 
complication still arises in that the existence of the broadly shared word meanings cannot be 
assumed; it would have to be verified by careful cross-linguistic comparison for a domain of 
interest. An empirical complication also arises in that in many such domains where cross-
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linguistic data have been examined, word meanings have turned out to be more variable than 
previously imagined. Even though substantial elements of the human experience of sensory 
input, emotion, or space, for instance, might be universal (e.g., Clark, 1973; Ekman, 1992; 
Henning, 1916), recent investigations have shown that sensory vocabularies (Majid & Levinson, 
2011), emotion terms (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1999, 2009) and spatial term inventories and meanings 
(Bowerman, 1996a, b) are considerably variable across languages. Perception of the body or of 
human locomotion might be heavily constrained by structure in the stimulus domain (body joints 
or biomechanics of movement), but the current work and our earlier work (Majid et al., 2006; 
Malt et al., 2008) has shown cross-linguistic diversity in these domains, too. The body part and 
locomotion work does show that alongside diversity, the structural constraints are reflected in 
shared elements of meaning. However, it seems impossible to discern from only a single 
language what the shared elements will be and which parts of the patterns are idiosyncratic to the 
language.  
The domain of natural kinds is another for which it has been argued that structure in the 
world will give rise to shared elements of meaning (Berlin, 1992; Hunn, 1977) – in this case, the 
structure being clusters of correlated properties separating scientific genera such as bovines 
versus equines. Berlin (1992), Hunn (1977) and others (see Malt, 1995, for review) document 
that non-industrialized cultures tend to recognize by name much the same sorts of groupings that 
modern science and more technologically advanced cultures do. But again, the broad similarities 
are accompanied by differences. Primary names that label rich, important, frequently used 
conceptual content for members of traditional societies sometimes point to highly impoverished 
representations for members of urban societies (such as elm versus oak versus chestnut; 
Dougherty, 1978; Wolff, Medin, & Pankratz, 1999) due to attrition of knowledge bases over 
cultural time. Conversely, some significant groupings may lack labels in various languages, as in 
the case of labels for plants versus animals mentioned earlier, as well as groupings within them 
that are appreciated but of lesser cultural utility (see Malt, 1995, for review). Furthermore, 
although many groupings labeled with primary names may reflect structure in the world, some 
may depend on properties such as domesticity or use. In fact, many English names for familiar 
naturally occurring entities pick out groupings based on their role in human lives rather than 
biology, e.g., weed, tree, vegetable, dog (see Malt, 1991) and so do not reflect world structure of 
the sort argued to produce cross-linguistic similarities. Most likely, the degree to which words of 
a single language can directly reveal shared concepts for a domain for speakers of different 
languages will fall on a continuum from poor to better (but still imperfect). The cases just 
discussed indicate that it may not be possible to discern what is poor and what is better without 
detailed empirical study.  
Despite the complex nature of the relationship between language and general-purpose 
concepts, our data suggest that it is still possible to use linguistic data to gain insight into 
something more fundamental about the nature of conceptual space. That is, combining naming 
information across languages does seem to provide useful information, because the aggregate 
allows commonalities to emerge over the “noise” of individual language idiosyncracies. 
Sometimes naming data are more readily available for researchers than data such as similarity 
judgments. This is particularly true for those already in a position to collect data from members 
of different language communities through simple paper and pencil tasks, or who have access to 
archived data on naming for domains of interest. However, it is clear that there are also 
methodological challenges involved in collecting naming data across languages, in particular, 
gaining access to participants who speak diverse languages, and having available the language 
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expertise to administer tasks and interpret data from the various languages. For researchers 
whose usual methodologies entail only members of one language group, obtaining such cross-
linguistic data may not be feasible. In those cases, developing other methods of avoiding the 
problem of faulty reliance on a word-concept equivalence will be crucial, such as finding ways to 
implement measures less dependent on language.  
 
3.2 If there is a Shared Conceptual Space, Why don’t Individual Naming Patterns Align 
Better?  
The possibility of a significant dissociation of naming patterns from how people understand a 
domain non-linguistically raises the question of why languages diverge in their naming patterns 
in the first place. If there are shared experiences across cultures in at least some domains, why 
wouldn’t the naming patterns for those domains align more closely? The answer most likely lies 
in the facts that (a) words encode only a fraction of the richness of experience and (b) the 
meanings encoded in any particular set are shaped in part by forces independent of the 
conceptual representations of current speakers. Some elements of arbitrariness in the early 
development of a set of meanings will exist, simply because of the limitation on how much 
words can encode. As the language continues to evolve, external forces such as contact with 
other languages, waxing or waning of the importance of a domain to the culture, the introduction 
of new entities within the domain that need to be named and the order in which they enter the 
culture, and influences from the syntax and morphology of language on how distinctions can be 
expressed, can alter the set of words available in a domain and the meanings associated with 
each word (e.g., Aitchinson, 2001; see Malt et al., 2010 for discussion). Because each language 
evolves on its own path, and the current state of a language is always a function, in part, of past 
states (e.g., Dunn, Greenhill, Levinson, & Gray, 2011), languages will develop their own 
patterns of naming that may be only loosely related to one another, as well as only loosely 
related to current ways of thinking about the world by their speakers. 
 
3.3 Implications for Property Projection 
Promoting inferences has been taken to be a critical benefit of putting names on things (e.g., 
Gelman & Markman, 1986; Heit, 2000; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990; Quine, 
1970). The partially arbitrary nature of linguistic categories highlights the fact that inferences 
will not always be well-circumscribed by named categories. For instance, consider the English 
names chair, knife, and spoon. A beach chair is light but an armchair is heavy; a desk chair has a 
rigid seat but a beanbag chair does not; a kitchen chair may be wood and a folding chair metal. A 
kitchen knife is intended for cutting but a frosting knife for spreading; a soup spoon is for 
scooping up liquids but a slotted spoon for draining them; a hair brush is for smoothing but a 
scrub brush is for scrubbing. This imperfect matching of properties to names is not limited to 
artifacts: Although chihuahuas and Siberian huskies share the property of domesticity that 
projects across things called dog, other properties such as size, strength, home (small or large, 
indoors or out) and ability to withstand cold may be more shared with things called cat or wolf. 
Relying heavily on names to make inferences, then, might often produce results that would turn 
out to be inaccurate. To the extent that inferences about unseen properties are accurate, they may 
be made by projecting on the basis of observed commonalities with familiar instances more often 
than is generally acknowledged (see also Gelman & Davidson, 1990). Despite Rogers and 
McClelland’s (2004) problematic use of English words to identify concepts, their model provides 
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a useful demonstration of how such inferences can be drawn without an explicit process of 
categorization intervening between perception of an entity and property projection.  
 
3.4 Implications for the Notion of “Concepts”  
The combined naming data from the four languages produces a fairly interpretable scaling 
solution suggesting that naming is driven by some fundamentally shared understanding of the 
characteristics of human locomotion. Different languages may make different numbers of 
distinctions and vary somewhat in what kinds of distinctions are being made, but they may seem 
to be drawing on a shared pool of dimensions. Similar observations have been made for other 
domains (e.g., Jones, 2010; Majid et al., 2008; see also Slobin, 2010, on locomotion). Yet the 
scaling solutions, while suggesting some shared understanding of the domain across speakers of 
different languages, and some salient groupings of instances, still leave it unclear exactly what 
units of knowledge should count as the most fundamental, basic concepts of the domain. 
Different levels of the cluster analysis produce different potential answers.  
 The difficulty of specifying exactly what constitute the basic concepts suggests that it 
may be time for psychologists to more radically rethink conceptual understanding of a domain. 
Despite the widespread claims that cognition centrally involves concepts, it is hard to pin down a 
satisfying definition of what they are. The attempts that we cited at the outset of this paper by 
Murphy (2002), Carey (2009), and others in entire books on the topic are somewhat vague. In a 
review of research on concepts and categories, Medin and Rips (2005) comment that “The 
concept of concepts is difficult to define, but no one doubts that concepts are fundamental to 
mental life and human communication” (p. 37). Smith and Medin (1981), in their seminal book 
that spurred much subsequent use of the term, never provided an explicit definition of what 
concepts are. Authors of textbooks for cognitive psychology have similar difficulties. For 
instance, Benjafield (2007), in a section entitled “What are concepts?” offers only that when 
people see something as belonging to a category, they are using a concept. Some widely-used 
textbooks have abandoned chapters on concepts altogether in favor of discussing the contents of 
knowledge representations without reference to the term concept (e.g., Goldstein, 2005; 
Willingham, 2007). It is an unsatisfactory situation when researchers believe that something is 
fundamental to mental life but they cannot articulate exactly what that something is.   
 One alternative approach to understanding where shared elements of mental 
representation are to be found is represented by the search for smaller units of knowledge that are 
primitives or “meaning-moles” such as EVENT, STATE, THING, PATH, PLACE, GOAL, 
MEANS, and END, etc. (e.g., Jackendoff, 1990; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Schank & 
Abelson, 1977; Slobin, 1996b; and Talmy, 1985; see Pinker, 2007)
3
. Although psychologists 
interested in concepts have not looked very much in this direction in the past, more attention to 
this approach is emerging (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002; Feist, 2008; Göksun et al., 2010; 
Parish-Morris, Pruden, Ma, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2010; Slobin, 2010). For instance, 
researchers interested in causal verbs propose that basic notions such as CAUSE, ENABLE, and 
PREVENT underlie the semantics of diverse verbs in various languages (e.g., Wolff, Klettke, 
Ventura, & Song, 2005). Researchers interested in the acquisition of spatial terms have suggested 
notions such as CONTACT, CONTAINMENT, and SUPPORT as components of meaning (e.g., 
Bowerman, 1996a, b; Choi & Bowerman, 1991). Dimensions rather than individual features 
(such as reversibility of an action or predictability of the outcome of an action, as suggested by 
Majid et al., 2008, for verbs of cutting and breaking) may also be relevant types of elements. 
These postulated shared elements are generally more “primitive”, in the sense of isolating single 
16 
 
properties or dimensions, than those thought of as concepts by mainstream concepts researchers 
and others who draw from this tradition.  
Our scaling and clustering analyses suggest perceived dimensions of gait space that can 
contribute to this set of units of knowledge. In fact, this sort of more fine-grained breakdown of 
knowledge is implied by the connectionist approach to modeling cognition (despite the tendency 
to label the inputs and outputs with words of a language). As Smolenksy (1988) and others have 
emphasized, connectionist networks are “subsymbolic” in that the features the system uncovers, 
constituting its learned knowledge base, are more subtle than those labeled by many words of a 
human language
4
. Perhaps it is at this level of analysis that the term concept can be most 
meaningfully applied.  
 In this type of approach, the goal is not to identify discrete, bounded, and stable units of 
knowledge stored in long-term memory. As such, concerns about failure to find defining features 
associated with fixed categories that were raised in the early backlash against classical views of 
concepts and compositional approaches to word meaning (e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Smith & Medin, 
1981) do not apply. Instead, the dimensions of experience to which people attend under various 
circumstances are the key point of interest. This approach is consistent with some minority views 
on concepts (e.g., Barsalou, 1987; Imai & Saalbach, 2010; Malt & Sloman, 2007; Smith & 
Samuelson, 1997; Sloman & Malt, 2003) according to which the particular dimensions of focus 
vary depending on the context and the goals at hand. According to this perspective, what is 
brought to mind and experienced as a coherent grouping varies across experiences due to 
differing task demands. For instance, our similarity judgment task directed participants to focus 
attention on certain elements of the actions, but it is possible that under other circumstances their 
attentional weight to various elements would have differed. When language is engaged in a task, 
it will require attention to the elements of a scene that are necessary for using the words of the 
language to be spoken, directing attention to features that may differ from when a different 
language is used or no language is used (e.g., Papafragou et al., 2008; Papafragou, Massey, & 
Gleitman, 2006; Slobin, 1996a; see also Davidoff, Goldstein, Tharp, Wakui, & Fagot, 2012; 
Roberson & Davidoff, 2000; and Webster & Kay, 2012 in the domain of color). Thus speakers of 
different languages may activate similar representations under some circumstances and different 
ones under others. Regardless, the key point here is that the representations are flexibly utilized 
and differ from situation to situation. The variability of attention to features of a situation is 
supported by recent brain imaging data showing that even in simple motion perception events, 
different brain regions may be activated by instructions to judge different aspects of the event 
(e.g., Büchel, Josephs, Rees, Turner, Frith, & Friston, 1998; Raymond, 2000).  It seems 
impossible to identify a single task that would unambiguously be the right one to decide what the 
discrete and stable concepts are for the domain. 
This sort of more “primitive”-oriented description of conceptual space has so far been 
applied mainly to actions of various sorts and spatial relations. If thought of in terms of 
dimensions, not just “meaning-moles”, then it seems suitable for describing artifact conceptual 
representations as well, with relevant dimensions likely to include both physical attributes such 
as material and shape and affordance- or intention-related ones such as current or potential 
function. In fact, given the high property diversity among objects that can share a name and the 
tendency for objects to be scattered with only partial clustering in similarity space (Malt et al., 
1999), this sort of approach may be well suited to this object domain. Exactly how well it can 
work for natural kinds, and what sorts of dimensions of conceptual space would be involved for 
them, remains to be worked out. Given the importance of beliefs about hidden essences in 
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conceptualization of natural kinds (e.g., Keil, 1989), it will be important to consider how such 
beliefs can be incorporated. More abstract domains such as emotions or truth and beauty will 
also be a challenge for this kind of approach, but they are no less a challenge under more 
traditional approaches. Assuming that there are concepts called happiness or truth does nothing 
to specify the contents of the representations.  
 
3.5 Future Directions 
The preceding points suggest several avenues for researchers to pursue, including extending a 
conceptual primitives or meaning-mole approach to additional domains and more fully 
understanding what elements of knowledge are activated in different task contexts. For the first 
of these, we have argued for the use of cross-linguistic data as one means of uncovering 
underlying conceptual dimensions of a domain. Development of other methodologies would also 
be valuable. Because paradigms for research on young infants cannot rely on linguistic stimuli or 
responses, work on early cognitive development that seeks conceptual primitives or studies “core 
cognition” (e.g., Carey, 2009; Cisbra et al., 2003; Kinzler & Spelke, 2007; Spelke, 1994) may 
provide some useful models for work with older children and adults (see also Kalénine, Mirman, 
Middleton, & Buxbaum, 2012, on the use of eye movements to evaluate activation of different 
types of property representations). 
 But acknowledging a problem is always the first necessary step to solving it, and as our 
opening discussion illustrated, there is currently insufficient sensitivity to the problem of 
assuming a close alignment of words of a given language with concepts.  Much of the original 
problem is likely due to the predominance of monolingual English-speaking researchers in the 
early decades of Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science is rapidly become a more international 
pursuit. One consequence is the participation of researchers who speak other native languages, 
often accompanied by proficiency in English. Along with this shift in researcher demographics 
has been an information technology revolution resulting in the growth of international 
collaborations as well as greater access to participant populations outside of English-speaking 
parts of the world. These changes will inevitably make linguistic variation more salient in 
theoretical considerations, while at the same time making research across languages more 
feasible.  
 An arena where cross-linguistic variability has already come to prominence is in the 
study of the acquisition and use of word knowledge by bilinguals.  Initial concerns for cross-
linguistic variability in word meaning focused on words for abstract ideas and culture-dependent 
construals of aspects of the world. However, researchers more recently have begun to look at the 
impact of non-equivalences of concrete nouns on bilingual word knowledge (e.g., Ameel et al., 
2005; Gathercole & Moawad, 2010).  This work highlights the issues we have raised here by 
proposing language-specific patterns of links from encoded features to words of each language 
(Ameel et al., 2005). A second arena is the renewed interest in the potential influence of 
language on thought. As we discussed earlier, cross-linguistic variability carries strong 
implication for assumptions about universality of concepts if concepts are taken to be revealed 
by the words of a single language. Attention to the Whorfian hypothesis prods researchers to 
come terms with the facts that if they assume word-concept equivalence, the concepts identified 
must be language-specific. If they do not want to study language-specific concepts, they must 
find methodologies that do not rely on this assumption.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
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If the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, then cognitive scientists need to re-
think how to find the concepts they want to understand. Pervasive diversity in how languages 
carve up the world by name is well-documented but has been given little consideration in the 
study of concepts. Once this diversity is recognized, it creates serious challenges to business as 
usual. The study of locomotion presented here examined what different ways of using words to 
access concepts suggest about the word-concept relationship. The data show that individual 
words such as walk, run, and jump, and by implication triangle, table, and robin, do not directly 
reveal units of knowledge compatible with prevailing notions of concepts. However, more 
sophisticated techniques can extract structure from language data and identify shared elements of 
meaning. These elements indicate constraints on cross-language variability and reflect common 
underlying components of domain knowledge. In doing so, they may suggest useful alternative 
approaches to the study of conceptual representation.   
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Footnotes 
 1.  We use “names” throughout this discussion to refer to the linguistic labels given to 
sets of objects, actions, relations, and properties (not only to those given to individual people, 
places, pets, etc., i.e., proper names). 
 2. There is considerable variation between Netherlands and Belgian Dutch, and also in 
varieties of Spanish and English spoken around the globe. Readers may have naming preferences 
that differ from those reported here due to dialect differences. Most notably, lopen has a 
substantially different use in Holland than in Belgium, being used primarily for fast locomotion 
in Belgium and slow locomotion in Holland.  
 3.  A related approach to the search for conceptual primitives occurs in recent 
developmental work on core cognition (e.g., Carey, 2009; Cisbra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; 
Kinzler & Spelke, 2007; Spelke, 1994), in which researchers study representations (e.g., of 
objecthood, causality, agency, and number) that may provide the foundations of more complex 
conceptual understanding. This work focuses more specifically on representations hypothesized 
to be innate and aims to understand their nature in detail.  
  Also related is recent work in computational and human neuroscience that seeks shared 
features underlying semantic representations (e.g., Just, Cherkassky, Aryal, & Mitchell, 2010) 
and argues for a continuous semantic space (Huth, Nishimoto, Vu, & Gallant, 2012). 
 4. Some early precursors to modern connectionist models were more “localist” in nature, 
having internal nodes labeled with words of a language (e.g., McClelland, Rumelhart, & Hinton, 
1986), but the essential nature of current models is that knowledge is reflected in a distributed 
pattern of activation across nodes.  
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Table 1 
 
Inventory of Locomotion Names   
_____________________________________________________________ 
          Language 
_____________________________________________________________ 
English    Dutch                 Spanish            Japanese 
_____________________________________________________________ 
creep hinkelen caminar aruku 
gallop huppelen correr hashiru 
hop joggen marchar sukippu-suru 
jog lopen saltar ashibumi-suru 
jump marcheren trotar kenken-suru 
leap rennen  koushin-suru 
march slenteren  janpu-suru 
run sluipen   
skip springen   
stomp stappen   
walk wandelen     
shuffle    
tiptoe    
power walk    
____________________________________________________________ 
Note.   Boldface indicates terms that have more than one morpheme.   
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Fig. 1.  Sample frames from clips.   
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Fig. 2. MDS solution based on American English naming data. Clip names refer to names 
bestowed by the experimenters, not names produced by participants.  
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Fig. 3. MDS solution based on Belgian Dutch naming data. Clip names refer to names bestowed 
by the experimenters, not names produced by participants.  
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Fig. 4.  MDS solution based on Argentinean Spanish naming data.  Clip names refer to names 
bestowed by the experimenters, not names produced by participants.  
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Fig. 5.  MDS solution based on Japanese naming data. Clip names refer to names bestowed by 
the experimenters, not names produced by participants.  
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Fig. 6.  MDS solution based on the four languages’ combined naming data. Clip names refer to 
names bestowed by the experimenters, not names produced by participants.  
 
